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Significant Activities (SIGACTS) Summary


From November 2006 – September 2007 1-12 CAV logged 4911 total SIGACTS for an average of 446 total SIGACTS per month.  The two highest months were February and July with 578 and 810 total SIGACTS respectively.  During the month of February 1-12 CAV conducted 10 company or higher level operations, only slightly higher than the deployment average of 9.2 per month.  From this it appears that the spike in SIGACTS during the month of February was due to increased enemy activity.


During the month of July two major operations (ARROWHEAD RIPPER and ISOLATE OLD BAQUBAH) were conducted in Baqubah, with 1-12 CAV conducting its deployment high of 16 company or battalion operations during this time.  Additionally, 2100 additional coalition soldiers were conducting major clearing operations during this month.  This does not include 2-1 CAV in Khan Bani Sa’ad and 5-73 RSTA in the Diyala River Valley.  This suggests that the spike in SIGACTS during the month of July was due to increased coalition activity as evidenced by the increase in soldiers and in operations.


Total Hostile SIGACTS, as defined by a SIGACT in which a 1-12 CAV unit was either directly or indirectly engaged by hostile fire, followed the same pattern as that of Total SIGACTS.  The two high months for Hostile SIGACTS were February with 454 and July with 463.  The difference between Total SIGACTS and Total Hostile SIGACTS during the month of July was most likely due to an increased frequency of found caches; a found cache was not classified as a Hostile SIGACT for the purposes of this Unit History.  The average number of Hostile SIGACTS per month was 283.


The low month for both Total and Hostile SIGACTS was April.  This corresponds with four major clearing operations by the 5-20 IN battalion in eastern Baqubah, in the neighborhoods of Old Baqubah, Buhriz, Al Abarra, and Tahrir respectively.  The month of April was also approximately one month prior to the start of OPERATIONS ARROWHEAD RIPPER, anticipating upcoming operations, it is highly likely that many insurgents were either fleeing the area, putting their weapons into caches, or preparing to fight (whether or not they actually did later on).


Note that both Total and Hostile SIGACTS for the months of August September are similar to the number of SIGACTS during the month of November at the beginning of the deployment.  This roughly correlates with unofficial estimates that place the start of major combat around the end of November 2006.


Also note that the graphs below should be understood to be rough estimates, best analyzed for the activity trends and high and low points that they reveal.  The amount of SIGACTS will change throughout the year due to changes in reporting standards at the battalion, company, and platoon levels.  For example, at the battalion level, 30 IDF rounds received at the Buhriz IP outpost may count as a single SIGACT depending how closely spaced in time that the rounds impacted.  Also, the duration and intensity of contact is not clearly reflected in the charts below, i.e. both a 3 hour firefight and a single instance of sporadic SAF will count as a single SIGACT.  As many front-line platoons began to become desensitized to contact, AIF contact would only be reported if deemed significant by the patrol leader (the standards varying widely by unit).

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